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Sustainability and the Courts:
A Snapshot of Canada in 2009
by Katia Opalka and Joanna Myszka*

C

Introduction

anada is a country with a small population, a large
resource base, and only one big neighbor.   Canada’s
influence in the post-World War II period owed a lot
to the role of External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson, who
found a peaceful resolution to the Suez Canal Crisis.1  The future
Prime Minister helped shape the world’s image of Canada as a
big, green place populated by reasonable, peace-loving people.
Likewise, the desire of Canada’s governments and its people to
solve problems amicably has limited the role of the courts in
advancing sustainable development in Canada.  While the government continues to view litigation as “un-Canadian,” citizens
and environmental groups are using litigation as a means to
protect the environment. Meanwhile, Canada’s green brand has
lost value, mainly because the government has shied away from
environmental regulation and enforcement.

Use of the Courts by the Government
We should begin by saying that sustainable development—
that is, development that meets the needs of current generations
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs—is achieved through standard-setting and planning,
not litigation. In other words, judicial action can enforce compliance with plans (like land use plans) and standards (like building
codes), but it cannot fill the void when plans and standards are
missing.

Land Use Planning
After Canada became the first industrialized country to
ratify the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in
1992,2 it developed, but ultimately failed to put into practice, an
ecological land use planning framework3 that would provide a
degree of certainty to natural resource industries (for example,
mining, oil and gas, and forestry). The framework was intended
to help establish where development would be prohibited and
where it might be allowed, subject to intense coordination across
industry sectors. For example, such coordination could minimize the overall impacts associated with expansion of the road
network into wild areas.4
The reason for Canada’s relative failure to plan resource
development in a sustainable fashion lies in the constitutional
division of legislative powers between the provinces and the
federal government.5 The provinces own most of the land in
Canada.6 In that respect, the provinces still resemble the individual colonies that banded together to form a compact in 1867.7
The provinces also have exclusive legislative authority, subject
to rules of federal paramountcy, to legislate regarding natural
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resource development on these “provincial Crown lands.”8 In
principle, regardless of how poorly a province performs in conserving biodiversity on its land base, the federal government
does not step in.

Treaties
In Canada, as in the United States, the federal government represents the country when it comes to reporting on the
implementation of international treaties.9 Because of their wide
ranging legislative jurisdiction under the Constitution, the provinces play a key role in treaty implementation. Thus, in regard
to the Biodiversity Convention, for example, while the federal
government must report to the international community regarding Canada’s progress on implementation, there is little the federal government can do to force the provinces to achieve such
implementation. Similarly, the federal government cannot force
the provinces to implement the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”),10 under which each
of Canada, the United States, and Mexico commit to effectively
enforce their environmental laws. Only Alberta, Manitoba, and
Quebec have ratified the NAAEC, and therefore, Canada is only
accountable for those three provinces as regards enforcement of
provincial environmental laws in Canada.11
For all rules, there are exceptions, and the Migratory Birds
Convention12 signed with the United States in 1916 is the exception here. Great Britain entered into the Convention on behalf of
Canada, and therefore, because of a rule in the Canadian Constitution, the federal government has sole authority to implement
that treaty.13 Because birds are everywhere, the federal government has very broad power to use the courts to enforce migratory bird protection legislation on provincial Crown land (and
by extension regulate natural resource extractive industries that
operate there) but has hesitated to do so.
R. v. Hydro-Québec
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in
R. v. Hydro-Québec14 is a leading SCC ruling on the federal
authority to legislate on environmental matters, but the decision
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is controversial. In Hydro-Québec, the SCC upheld the toxics
provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1988
on the basis that the provisions constituted a valid exercise of
the federal government’s constitutional authority to legislate
criminal law.15 That decision, though a victory for the federal
government, also seemed to tie its hands. Because the criminal law power is the power to create prohibitions and impose
sanctions, not the power to create elaborate regulatory schemes,
some commentators argue that the SCC should have upheld the
legislation as a valid exercise of the federal government’s constitutional power to make laws for the “peace, order and good
government” of Canada (the “POGG Power”).16 Had the legislation been upheld under the POGG Power, the federal government would not have been left feeling hampered in its ability
to adopt federal environmental regulations, though here again,
views differ.17

The Common Law

most of the senior personnel at Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, and all provincial environmental departments
retired or preparing to retire, many posts have been eliminated
or left vacant.23 Because prosecution sometimes results in constitutional challenges to the underlying legislation24 and crossdemands against the Government, private firms must be hired
and costs can quickly spiral out of control.25 Those costs are
absorbed by departments with environmental protection responsibilities. Those departments normally choose to use their scant
resources to focus on programs that are assured to deliver some
benefits for the environment, rather than take a risk with protracted litigation.26 However, Canada does have one notable
prosecution success story. In 1993, Tioxide Canada Inc. was
fined four million Canadian dollars for consistently failing to
heed Government demands that it install a system to treat its
toxic effluent before discharging it into the Saint Lawrence
River.27

Use of the Courts by Citizens and
Environmental Groups

There is no common law requirement that governments
enforce the law—environmental or otherwise.18 There is only
potential civil liability if the government adopts an enforcement policy and then acts contrary to that policy, causing
harm.19 Enforcement policies for federal environmental laws
in Canada are fraught with provisions that make prosecution
highly unlikely. The policies
identify enforcement responses
to instances of suspected noncompliance, reserving prosecution for cases where the intent
to commit the offense can be
established, and where harm to
the environment is significant.20
Because most violations of environmental laws are unintended,
and because most violations do
not have major environmental
impacts (though thousands of
little violations by hapless violators probably do), prosecution
normally does not occur.

As explained above, governments in Canada have generally
not relied on the courts to achieve sustainable development. This
is in part owed to a failure to adopt a planning framework and
regulations that courts would
help enforce compliance with.
That said, citizens and environmental groups have turned to the
courts with some success, using
the very limited regulatory tools
at their disposal. These citizens
and environmental groups have
succeeded when they have used
the publicity that comes with litigation as a high profile means
of forcing the government’s
hand. Litigants have been less
successful in their attempts to
get around carefully worded
provisions in environmental
laws that essentially allow the government to do nothing. Examples are provided below.

The Department of Justice

 Private Prosecutions (Fisheries Act)

While a department such as Environment Canada may
recommend prosecution in certain cases, the decision to press
charges is made by the Attorney General (the Department of
Justice).21 That department has its own rules for deciding which
cases will go forward.

Under the federal Fisheries Act, it is an offense to disturb
or destroy fish habitat and to discharge deleterious substances
into waters frequented by fish.28 Individuals can bring charges
against violators, though the provincial or federal attorneys
general can stay those charges or take over the prosecution.29
Private prosecutions are often stayed. When they have not been
stayed, however, private prosecutions have led to high profile
guilty verdicts, notably against municipalities.30 Environmental
scientists who were laid off by governments have helped environmental groups, such as the Environmental Bureau of Investigation, gather evidence of Fisheries Act violations. EcoJustice,
a non-governmental organization, has provided legal representation for environmental groups seeking judicial redress for

Enforcement policies for
federal environmental
laws in Canada are
fraught with provisions
that make prosecution
highly unlikely

Budgets and Politics
Finally, budgetary and political concerns affect the Government’s use of the courts to enforce environmental legislation. Politicians decide whether to allocate human and financial
resources to environmental law enforcement. In Canada, environmental budgets have been cut in successive rounds of program review every couple of years since the early 1990s.22 With
Fall 2009

60

environmental wrongs.31 These groups document government
and industry failures regarding compliance with the Fisheries
Act by tracking municipal effluent quality across the country,32
discharges from pulp and paper mills, etc. The groups also
publish publicly-available guides on how to launch a private
prosecution.33

Civil Suits
Two interesting decisions of the SCC involving civil suits
on environmental matters are summarized below.34 Here, we
will only mention a civil suit provision in a Canadian environmental statute.
Under the NAAEC, Canada committed to provide environmental remedies to its citizens.35 The Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999 (“CEPA”) creates an “environmental protection action,” a civil suit that can be launched by adult residents of Canada against a party alleged to have committed an
offense under CEPA.36 Provided that the alleged harm to the
environment is significant, the plaintiff may apply for various
sorts of injunctive relief, but not damages.37 Before taking such
an action, the plaintiff must have first requested that Environment Canada investigate the matter, and then must have convinced a judge that Environment Canada’s response was either
too slow or unreasonable.38 To
our knowledge, no environmental protection actions have been
brought since the act came into
force.

Judicial Review

Supreme Court Decisions
Summarized below are leading SCC decisions, rendered in
the last decade, on matters related to sustainable development.

The Precautionary Principle—Spraytech
In Spraytech v. Hudson,46 the SCC decided the constitutionality of a by-law adopted by the Town of Hudson, Québec,
banning the use of cosmetic pesticides. Charged with using pesticides in violation of the bylaw, Spraytech moved to have
the Superior Court of Québec
declare the by-law inoperative and ultra vires the town’s
authority because it conflicted
with the provincial Pesticides
Act.47 The Superior Court held,
and the Québec Court of Appeal
confirmed, that Hudson had the
power to enact the by-law.48
The SCC upheld the by-law
because it did not impose a total
ban on the use of pesticides.49
The by-law only prohibited the
use of pesticides in non-essential cases, such as for “purely
aesthetic pursuits.”50
The SCC’s decision in Spraytech appears to be informed by a broad vision of environmental
law and the role of government in promoting the general welfare. For example, Justice L’Heureux Dubé began her opinion
by stating that the context of the case includes “the realization
that our common future, that of every Canadian community,
depends on a healthy environment.”51 The Court deferred to the
authority of elected municipal bodies, holding that courts should
not dictate to municipalities what is best for their constituents.52
The Court also emphasized that the purpose of the by-law was in
line with the precautionary principle recognized in international
law, namely, that sustainable development policies “anticipate,
prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation.”53

[C]itizens and
environmental groups
have succeeded when they
have used the publicity
that comes with litigation
as a high profile means of
forcing the government’s
hand

Applications for judicial
review are favored by environmental groups in Canada as a
means of forcing the government to implement conservation
statutes such as environmental
assessment or endangered species legislation. Such litigation
generally turns on an analysis
of the administrative authority’s
discretion—in other words, does
the act say “the Minister shall” or
“the Minister may”? The SCC ruling in Friends of the Oldman
River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport)39 is the leading case regarding ministerial discretion on permitting decisions
that trigger environmental assessment requirements. The decision of the SCC in that case set in motion a process that resulted
in the adoption of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(“CEAA”).40
The principal focus of judicial review applications under
CEAA has been the federal government’s reluctance to conduct
wide-ranging reviews of project environmental impacts. Though
environmental groups have had some notable successes in this
area,41 the tendency of the Federal Court has been to stick to the
plain language of the act, which gives federal authorities broad
discretion as regards project and assessment “scoping,” provided
61

the agency can establish that it did not actively avoid applying
the law—for example, by relying on a provincial agency to follow up on matters covered by the federal legislation.42
Environmental groups have been somewhat successful
in using judicial review to pressure the federal government to
develop recovery strategies for species listed under the Species
at Risk Act.43 Here, the litigation has focused on questions, such
as whether it is reasonable for the federal government not to
intervene where provincial recovery actions are potentially ineffectual,44 and whether the federal government must identify (and
therefore protect) the critical habitat of a species as part of the
development and implementation of a recovery strategy, along
with the question of what is the difference between habitat and
critical habitat.45
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The Polluter Pays Principle (Clean-Up Orders)—
Imperial Oil
In Imperial Oil Ltd v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment)54 the SCC decided the legality of a clean-up order issued
by the Quebec Minister of the Environment (the “Minister”)
against Imperial Oil (“Imperial”) under provincial polluter-pay
legislation. In the 1980s, a real estate developer discovered oil
pollution at a former Imperial oil site on the shore of the Saint
Lawrence River, opposite Quebec City. The land was decontaminated with the approval of provincial governmental authorities and houses were built, but the pollution resurfaced in the
1990s. Residents brought an action against the developer, the
town, Imperial Oil, and the environment ministry.55 The Minister ordered Imperial to carry out a site assessment.56 Imperial claimed that the Minister had a conflict of interest because
the Minister had approved earlier clean-up work and was now
being sued.
In deciding that the Minister
did not have a conflict of interest, the SCC held that the Minister wears two hats, adjudicative
and managerial, and that when
the Minister issued the assessment order the Minister was
not adjudicating but rather performing the Minister’s jobs of
implementing Québec’s environmental protection legislation.57
The Minister had a political duty
to address the contamination
problem and “choose the best
course of action, from the standpoint of the public interest.”58 The SCC went beyond analyzing
principles of administrative law when it decided Imperial Oil by
also considering the context of environmental protection legislation. As in Spraytech, the SCC emphasized that Québec environmental legislation is concerned not only with safeguarding the
environment of today, but it is also concerned with “evidence of
an emerging sense of inter-generational solidarity and acknowledgment of an environmental debt to humanity and the world of
tomorrow.”59

SCC also found that Article 976 of the Civil Code requires no
proof of fault.63 This article reads: “Neighbours shall suffer the
normal neighbourhood annoyances that are not beyond the limit
of tolerance they owe each other, according to the nature or location of their land or local custom.”64
According to the SCC, conduct is not the deciding criterion
when it comes to abnormal annoyances under Article 976.65
Rather, liability is triggered when the nuisance becomes excessive or intolerable. The SCC relied on legal commentary and
precedent to find that Article 976 required no proof of fault,
but the court also asserted that no-fault liability “furthers environmental protection objectives” and “reinforces the application of the polluter-pay principle, which [the] Court discussed
in [Imperial Oil].”66 Quoting Imperial Oil, the SCC reinforced
the principle that, in order to promote sustainable development,
polluters should be liable for the direct and immediate costs
of pollution.67

Canada’s refusal to own
up to its shortcomings
has resulted in Canadian
delegations being
sidelined at global
summits

The Polluter Pays Principle (Class Actions)—
St. Lawrence Cement
In St. Lawrence Cement Inc v. Barrette,60 residents of
Beauport, Québec, instituted a class action against St. Lawrence
Cement Inc. (“SLC”) for dust, odor, and noise nuisances related
to the operation of a local cement plant. The residents based their
claim on the general rules of fault-based civil liability, as well as
on the good-neighbour provision of the Québec Civil Code.61
Under Article 1457 of the Civil Code, the claimants were
required to establish fault, damage, and causation.62 The SCC
reversed the Québec Court of Appeal and upheld the decision of
the trial judge, finding that SLC had not committed a civil fault
since plant operations complied with applicable standards. The
Fall 2009

Environmental Loss—
Canfor

In British Columbia v.
Canadian Forest Products
Ltd.,68 the British Columbia
(“BC”) government sought a
damages award against Canadian Forest Products Ltd.
(“Canfor”) in connection with
a forest fire that burned 1,491
hectares of forest in the BC interior. Canfor was largely responsible for the fire. 69 The BC
government sued in its capacity
as owner of the land, that is, it
launched a commercial action for the diminution of the value
of timber.70 The SCC ruled that the government could also have
sued as a representative of the public, for damages resulting
from the environmental impact of the forest fire.
The SCC held that as defender of the public interest, the
government can sue for environmental loss based on the law
of public nuisance.72 The Court considered, and eventually
dispensed with, the argument that in such cases, only injunctive relief is available. First, it noted that Canadian courts have
not always adhered to the narrow view that the role of the government in public nuisance is to put a stop to the activity that
constitutes an interference with the public’s rights.73 Second,
the Court indicated that, under the common law of the United
States, “it has long been accepted that the state has a common
law parens patriae jurisdiction to represent the collective interests of the public.”74
According to the Court, the parens patriae doctrine has led
to successful claims for monetary compensation for environmental damage in the United States, and there should be no legal barrier to a government claim for compensation in an action based
on public nuisance in Canada.75 Nonetheless, the SCC refused
to assess and award such damages because complete arguments
for such a claim were not made at the trial and appellate level.76
62

Conclusion
Neither the common law nor Canada’s environmental statutes make the government liable for failing to enforce environmental laws. This makes it difficult for environmental groups
to require government to improve its performance in this area.
Private law is returning to the fore as a source of remedies for
citizens seeking redress for environmental wrongs. Until Canada
has a government plan for sustainable development, one that is
translated into binding standards, the courts will be of limited
assistance. Canada’s international influence will continue to
wane.
There is some irony to Canada’s predicament. Since the
1950’s, Canada has enjoyed an unlikely place at the sides of
the world’s powerful countries because of its ability to exercise moral suasion effectively. In the 1980’s, when Canada and
the world began to fully appreciate the need to protect people
and nature from the negative effects of economic development, the government sought to gain acceptance of domestic

environmental regulation by inviting stakeholders to do the right
thing, an approach that had worked for Canada in international
relations. If only the federal government could work on a cooperative basis with industry and the provinces to achieve mutually
beneficial outcomes, it was thought, Canada would again shine
through its non-confrontational approach. Unfortunately, after
twenty years of industry self-regulation, voluntary programs,
and federal-provincial environmental accords, the country is
nowhere near its goal of building a sustainable economy.
Canada’s refusal to own up to its shortcomings has resulted
in Canadian delegations being sidelined at global summits. In
all likelihood, it is not so much the failure itself as the refusal to
own up to it that has other countries riled. What they are probably thinking is: if the country with the second largest land base
(and one of the smallest populations) in the world cannot figure
out how to meet the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs, then at
the very least, we should stop taking their advice.
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Endnotes: Precautionary Principle in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea continued from page 64
1
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Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
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report from new window) [hereinafter Hormones]; see Panel Report, European
Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/
DS/293R-00.doc [hereinafter Biotech Products].
8 See Hormones, supra note 7; see also Biotech Products, supra note 7.
9 See Appellate Body Report, Japan–Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26,
2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://
docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/245ABR.doc.
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See The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, available at http://www.unep.org/OZONE/
pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
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12 See Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection
225 (2009).
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Judgments” to “List of Cases”); see also Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 275 (2003).
14 Stephens, supra note 12, at 225.
15 See The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), 126 I.L.R. 334
(Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001) available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html
(follow link under “Proceedings and Judgments” to “List of Cases”); see also
Stephens, supra note 12, at 237.
16 Stephens, supra note 12, at 237; see also M. Bruce Volbeda, The MOX
Plant Case: The Question of “Supplemental Jurisdiction” for International
Environmental Claims Under UNCLOS, 42 Tex. Int’l L.J. 211, 213 (2006).
17 Stephens, supra note 12, at 237.
18 Stephens, supra note 12, at 237.
19 Montreal Protocol, supra note 10.
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